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SOLOMON’S CHOICE:  
THE CASE FOR GRANTING DERIVATIVE 
ASYLUM TO PARENTS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ow could a parent choose between abandoning her child in a for-
eign country and taking the child back to her home country to 
face persecution? Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a parent might 
even find herself in such a situation. Yet, this is precisely what can occur 
when a child confronts the type of persecution that targets children but 
does not directly affect adults. In those cases, the child would be eligible 
for asylum1 in the United States, but the parent would not. As a result, 
the parent would have no legal status in the United States and must 
choose between leaving the child here and taking her back to the country 
in which she was originally threatened with persecution. When the case 
is reversed—where a parent qualifies for asylum and the child does 
not—the child is eligible for derivative asylum status.2 As the name sug-
gests, the status is derived from the person applying for asylum. To qual-
                                                                                                                                  
*  The title of this Note was inspired by Judge Manion of the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, who described parents of persecuted children as facing a “distasteful Solo-
monic choice.” Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 1. Asylum is an immigration status that is granted to a noncitizen who is within the 
United States and satisfies the statutory definition of a refugee. The Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006). The INA states, in 
pertinent part:  
The term refugee means (A) any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.  
INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The statutory definition of an asylee is almost 
identical. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006). The only difference 
between the two types of status is that a refugee is in another country seeking refuge in 
the United States, while an asylum seeker has arrived in the United States. INA § 
208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The U.S. refugee definition is based on the definition in 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A), adopted July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
art. 1, adopted Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Proto-
col]. 
 2. The INA expressly provides for derivative status for the spouse and children of an 
asylee. INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3). 
H 
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ify for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a per-
son must be outside of her country of origin and have been persecuted3 or 
have a “well-founded fear4 of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.”5 Because the status of a child is derivative of her parent, the child 
need not prove that she has a well-founded fear of persecution; she need 
only prove her relationship to the asylee.6 In other words, the family 
connection alone is sufficient to grant the status. Underlying this deriva-
tive asylum provision is the policy of family unification that recurs 
throughout the INA.7 But, despite the premium the INA places on family 
unification, the derivative asylum provision only expressly names chil-
dren and spouses as potential beneficiaries.8 The provision is silent as to 
whether a parent can gain derivative asylum status from her child. 
Several recent cases have foregrounded this question and forced courts 
to consider if the INA provides relief for parents who seek asylum be-
cause their minor child has a well-founded fear of persecution.9 The 
                                                                                                                                  
 3. The INA does not define the term “persecution,” but the dominant case law holds 
that persecution is “either a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering 
or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.”  In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 211, 220–22 (1985). In addition, the “harm or suffering must be inflicted upon an 
individual in order to punish him for possessing a belief or characteristic a persecutor 
seeks to overcome.”  Id. at 222–23. Varying circuit court interpretations of persecution 
will be considered infra Part IV. 
 4. The term “well-founded fear” is discussed infra note 40. 
 5. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 6. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21 (2006). This regulation sets out the criteria of the relationship 
to the asylee and places the burden of proof on the asylum applicant to establish, by pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the potential beneficiary is an eligible spouse or child. 
Id. 
 7. The policy of family unification and reunification can be seen most distinctly in 
the provisions of the INA that create the preference system for family-sponsored immi-
gration to the United States. Under this regime, an unlimited number of immediate rela-
tives (spouses, minor children, and parents) of United States citizens over twenty-one are 
eligible for visas and not subject to numerical quotas. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 
1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). The category of immediate relatives is the most privileged class 
of family-based immigrants, with the visa quotas becoming more narrow as the family 
relation becomes less immediate. The entire scheme of family-based immigration to this 
country suggests how high a premium U.S. immigration law places on keeping families 
united and ensuring that immigrants have a familiar support system when they arrive in 
the country. For a hierarchy of the numerical quotas of family-sponsored immigrant vi-
sas, see INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2006). 
 8. INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21 (2006).  
 9. See Abebe v. Ashcroft (Abebe I), 379 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004) rev’d en banc by 
Abebe v. Gonzales (Abebe II), 432 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Tchoukhrova v. 
Gonzales (Tchoukhrova I), 404 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005), rehearing denied by Tchouk-
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cases in which this issue most frequently arises involve claims based on 
threat of female genital mutilation (FGM)10 to a minor daughter. In these 
cases, the child, if cognizant, has a well-founded fear of persecution on 
the grounds of FGM, but the parent does not.11 The parent, of course, has 
a well-founded fear of harm to the child, but does not have a fear of per-
secution in her own right. Thus, the only way to avoid a division of the 
family is to grant the parent derivative status. However, the courts and 
the applicants for asylum have generally resisted the argument that the 
parent can be a beneficiary of derivative asylum.12 Relying on the inter-
pretation that the silence of the INA on the subject precludes derivative 
asylum status from flowing from child to parent, the courts have found 
other ways of granting status to the parent in a situation where the child 
is the object of persecution. Invariably, if courts are inclined to grant 
                                                                                                                                  
hrova v. Gonzales (Tchoukhrova II), 430 F.3d 1222 (2005), vacated by Gonzales v. 
Tchoukhrova (Tchoukhrova III), 127 S. Ct. 57 (2006). 
 10. FGM refers to the practice of cutting the genitalia of young girls in certain Afri-
can countries. It can cause extreme pain and severe medical complications. AMNESTY 
INT’L, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION PACK (1997), 
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/femgen/fgm1.htm. See also IMMIGR. AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ALERT SER. AL/NGA/94.001, WOMEN: FEMALE GENITAL 
MUTILATION 1–5 (1994) [hereinafter INS FGM Alert]. Women and girls who object to 
the procedure have been granted asylum in the United States. See, e.g., In re Fauziya 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (1996). FGM will be explained and discussed at length 
infra Part II. The nomenclature of this practice is varied: female genital mutilation, fe-
male genital cutting, and female circumcision. Critics of the procedure tend to use one of 
the former two terms, while those who condone it use the latter. The position of the U.S. 
asylum law and the author of this Note is that the practice is persecution, torture, and a 
ground for asylum. Therefore, the Note will employ the term that best conveys the sever-
ity of the procedure: female genital mutilation. FGM is also the most commonly used and 
recognized terminology that refers to the procedure. For a discussion of the contentious 
terminology of this practice, see Hope Lewis, Between Irua and “Female Genital Mutila-
tion”: Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
1, 4–9 (1995). See also Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund, Female “Circumcision” 
in Africa: Dimensions of the Practice and Debates, in FEMALE “CIRCUMCISION” IN 
AFRICA: CULTURE, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE 6–7 (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Yvla 
Hernlund eds., 2000) (arguing that female genital cutting is the appropriate term because 
“female circumcision” is misleading as an analogy to male circumcision, while “female 
genital mutilation” is too judgmental of African cultures that practice the procedure). 
 11. The most recent case of this type is Abebe II, which will be discussed in detail 
infra Part III. Abebe I was originally decided in 2004 by a panel of three judges on the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 379 F.3d 755. It was later reheard en banc and decided as 
Abebe v. Gonzales in 2005. Abebe II, 432 F.3d 1037. This case will be discussed in detail 
infra Part III. 
 12. A notable exception to this approach is Judge Ferguson’s dissent in Abebe I, 
which forms a large part of the basis for the argument in this Note. Infra Part V. 379 F.3d 
at 760 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
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these cases, they do so under the theory that the parent herself has a well-
founded fear of persecution if she tries to protect her child,13 or that the 
parent will be persecuted by virtue of her relationship to the child.14 In 
either case, the parent must show that she has a well-founded fear of per-
secution to her own person. Following this theory, courts have had to 
“stretch” to find persecution where, in any other type of case, the fate 
facing the parent would not rise to the level of persecution.15 
In late 2005, the Ninth Circuit decided two cases that involved the 
question of derivative asylum for parents. The first was Abebe v. 
Ashcroft (Abebe I), which centered around an Ethiopian couple and their 
fear that their U.S. citizen child would be subjected to FGM if the family 
were deported to Ethiopia.16 The Ninth Circuit, in a three-member deci-
sion, denied the petitioner’s claim,17 but later a majority of the regular 
active judges on the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.18 The 
case was then decided en banc in late 2005 in Abebe v. Gonzales (Abebe 
II).19 In addition, the Ninth Circuit recently voted not to rehear en banc 
another case that involved the issue of derivative asylum for parents. The 
case was Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, which concerned a mother who ap-
plied for asylum with her son and husband as derivative applicants.20 In 
this case, the son was the primary object of persecution because he was a 
fourteen-year-old boy with cerebral palsy in Russia.21 In April 2005, the 
court, in a three-member decision, held that Russian children with dis-
abilities are eligible for asylum and that harm to the child can be imputed 
to the parents in support of their asylum applications.22 Unhappy with 
this ruling, the Department of Justice (DOJ) applied for rehearing, but 
                                                                                                                                  
 13. See, e.g., Abay v. Aschroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 14. See, e.g., Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d 1181. This case will be discussed in detail 
infra Part III. 
 15. For example, in Abay v. Aschroft, the Sixth Circuit held that parents’ fear of os-
tracism resulting from refusing to subject the child to FGM may amount to persecution. 
Abay, 368 F.3d 634. However, most courts find that ostracism does not rise to this level. 
This question will be discussed in depth infra Parts II & IV. 
 16. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 760. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Abebe v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2005) (vacating panel decision and 
ordering rehearing en banc). 
 19. Abebe II, 432 F.3d 1037. 
 20. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d 1181, 1187. 
 21. Id. at 1184. The son experienced a litany of harms that will be recounted infra 
Part III. 
 22. Id. at 1184, 1191. 
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the court decided not to rehear the case on December 5, 2005.23 In May 
2006, the Department of Justice petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 
of certiorari. On October 2, 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
vacating and remanding the case.24 
The asylum seekers and the court in both Abebe and Tchoukhrova did 
not maintain that the parents could derive asylum status from their 
child.25 Instead, they contended that the parents themselves were subject 
to persecution of their own because of their relationship to the child. For 
instance, in their brief on appeal, the parents in Abebe argued that they 
would face ostracism if they tried to protect their daughter from FGM; 
they did not argue that they were eligible for derivative asylum.26 Like-
wise, the courts have not decided these cases using the theory of deriva-
tive asylum. In Abebe I, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the par-
ents did not qualify for asylum because ostracism did not rise to the level 
of persecution.27 A year later, the court in Abebe II again decided the 
case without resolving the question of derivative asylum for parents.28 
Similarly, in Tchoukhrova, the Ninth Circuit held that the child’s perse-
cution harmed the family as a unit and therefore the family could claim 
asylum on the grounds that they made up a particular social group:29 a 
                                                                                                                                  
 23. Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d 1222. The decision not to rehear the case en banc was 
affirmed very narrowly, with seven judges dissenting. The dissent, written by Judge Koz-
inski, will be discussed infra Part IV and infra note 197. 
 24. Tchoukhrova III, 127 S. Ct. 57. 
 25. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1184; Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 758–60. 
 26. In their brief to the Ninth Circuit, the petitioners did not argue that they were eli-
gible for derivative asylum through their daughter; in relation to the FGM claim, they 
limited the argument to the possibility that they would face ostracism if they refused to 
subject their daughter to FGM. Brief for Petitioners at 18–19, Abebe v. INS, No. 02-
72390 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003). Similarly, the petitioner’s reply brief did not suggest that 
the parents were eligible for derivative asylum. Reply Brief for Petitioners, Abebe v. INS, 
No. 02-72390 (9th Cir. May 20, 2003). 
 27. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 759. 
 28. Abebe II, 432 F.3d at 1043. 
 29. The INA does not define the term “particular social group.” The leading case law 
on this ground for asylum is the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in In re Acosta:  
[W]e interpret the phrase ‘persecution on account of membership in a particular 
social group’ to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a 
member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable charac-
teristic . . . . However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the 
group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities or consciences. 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. However, the Ninth Circuit took a different view of “par-
ticular social group” in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, holding that the defining characteristic of 
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social group comprised of the family of a disabled child in Russia.30 
Thus, in addressing the claims in both Abebe and Tchoukhrova, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to hold that parents could receive derivative asylum. 
With these two cases in mind, this Note proposes that courts should 
grant asylum to the parents of persecuted children on the theory that they 
qualify for derivative asylum status through their child’s claim.31 Courts 
should not require that the parent show persecution to his or herself be-
cause this approach fails to place proper emphasis on the protection of 
the child. Moreover, requiring the parent to show persecution in her own 
right has the potential to affect the asylum laws adversely by diluting the 
very definition of “persecution.” In addition, the alternate theory on 
which these cases are granted—where the court considers harm to one 
member of a family as harm to the family unit—also serves to dilute the 
standards of asylum law by making grants of asylum too broad. As an 
alternative, this Note will consider the legal bases, policy concerns, and 
practical implications of granting cases on the theory of derivative asy-
lum for parents. In short, this Note aims to construct a solid rationale by 
which courts might grant such cases and, in addition, why Congress 
should amend the INA to specify that parents of persecuted children are 
eligible for derivative asylum. 
Part II of this Note provides a background of circuit court and Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) cases that considered the question of 
whether parents may be eligible for derivative asylum through their mi-
nor child. Part III focuses on the two recent cases in the Ninth Circuit. 
Part IV critiques the prevalent approach of requiring the parents to prove 
that they fear persecution to themselves or considering persecution to the 
family unit. Offering an alternative, Part V presents the legal and policy 
arguments in favor of granting derivative asylum status to parents. Part 
VI concludes that granting derivative asylum to the parents of a minor 
child is the preferred approach to cases where a minor child is the target 
of persecution. 
                                                                                                                                  
a “particular social group” is a “voluntary associational relationship among the purported 
members, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity 
as a member of that discrete social group.” Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 
(9th Cir. 1986). The two approaches of In re Acosta and Sanchez-Trujillo have been 
combined in the Department of Justice’s proposed rule on the topic that would revise the 
pertinent regulation of 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76593–76595, 76598 
(Dec. 7, 2000). 
 30. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1184, 1189–92. 
 31. In terms of the age limit on what it means to be a child, this Note adopts the 
INA’s definition of a child as “an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age.” INA 
§ 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). 
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II. BACKGROUND OF DERIVATIVE ASYLUM CASES 
The majority of cases that concern persecution of minor children in-
volves the practice of FGM in certain African countries.32 According to 
Amnesty International, eighty-five percent of all FGM procedures in Af-
rica are clitoridectomies, where all or part of the clitoris is removed.33 
Amnesty International estimates that two-million girls a year are at risk 
for undergoing some form of genital mutilation and that it occurs in 
twenty-eight African countries.34 FGM can lead to death, hemorrhage, 
infections, increased risk for contracting HIV, severe pain, psychological 
problems, and loss of sexual sensation.35 For these reasons, U.S. law has 
come to recognize FGM as both a federal crime36 and a ground for asy-
lum.37 
                                                                                                                                  
 32. Of the FGM cases discussed in this Note, five involve asylum seekers from Nige-
ria, Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004); Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013 
(9th Cir. 2004); Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003); Nwaokolo v. Ashcroft, 
314 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2002); two from Ethiopia, Abebe I, 379 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004); 
Abay, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); and one from Gambia, In re Dibba, (unpublished) 
No. A73 541 857 (BIA Nov. 23, 2001). 
 33. In addition to this practice, there is the more severe “infibulation” procedure, 
where all, or part, of the clitoris is removed. Then, all, or part, of the labia minora is re-
moved and the labia majora are then stitched together in order to cover the vagina. Am-
nesty International estimates that fifteen percent of all FGM in Africa involves this radi-
cal version of the practice. Lastly, the least severe procedure consists of only the removal 
of the clitoral hood. The timing of the procedure also may vary in different countries, 
ranging from infancy to the time of the first pregnancy, but the average time is between 
the ages of four and eight years of age. AMNESTY INT’L, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A 
HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION PACK, supra note 10. See also INS FGM ALERT 1–5, supra 
note 10. 
 34. AMNESTY INT’L, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION 
PACK, supra note 10. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2005). However, the widespread use of FGM in Africa suggests 
that many do not consider it to be a crime at all. The most common cultural explanations 
of the practice are that it ensures virginity, makes the girl marriageable, and ensures fidel-
ity once married. See ELIZABETH HEGER BOYLE, FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING: CONFLICT IN 
THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 27–31 (2002). For a multidisciplinary compilation on the ten-
sions between human rights and cultural relativism in the context of FGM, see generally 
FEMALE “CIRCUMCISION” IN AFRICA: CULTURE, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE supra note 
10. In addition, for a recent study of the incidence of FGM in Africa that considers the 
cultural, legal, medical, and ethical dimensions of the practice, see generally ROSEMARIE 
SKAINE, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: LEGAL, CULTURAL AND MEDICAL ISSUES (2005). 
 37. The first instance was a BIA decision, In re Fauziya Kasinga, in 1996. Kasinga, 
21 I. & N. Dec. 357. Kasinga, the asylum-seeker, was a woman from a particular tribe in 
Togo that practiced FGM. She was threatened with this practice when she was forced to 
marry at the age of seventeen and escaped before the procedure. Id. at 358. The BIA held 
that FGM, as practiced in Kasinga’s tribe, constituted persecution and that she was a 
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Since 2002 there have been at least a half-dozen cases in circuit courts 
where adult asylum applicants argued that their minor daughter would be 
subjected to FGM if she were returned to her country of origin.38 Parents 
in these cases have argued that the risk of FGM to their daughter formed 
the basis of a claim to some sort of immigration relief:39 asylum, with-
holding of removal,40 or relief under the Convention Against Torture 
                                                                                                                                  
member of a social group “consisting of young women . . . who have not had FGM, as 
practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.” Id. Further, the BIA found that she 
had a well-founded fear of persecution in the form of FGM on account of her member-
ship in this social group. Id. The BIA relied, in large part, upon the then recent INS Alert 
on FGM. INS FGM ALERT 1–5, supra note 10. Although Kasinga was granted asylum on 
a rather limited fact pattern, the precedent has been expanded to apply to asylum appli-
cants from a variety of countries who fear FGM or have been already subjected to FGM. 
See, e.g., Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18, 20, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that asylum 
seeker from Ghana had well-founded fear of persecution on account of her fear of FGM). 
It should be noted that subsequent to the Second Circuit’s decision in this case, Abank-
wah was found to have fabricated her story of persecution. Still, despite the unfortunate 
shadow such fraud casts over the facts of the case, the courts have continued to rely on 
Abankwah for its legal holding. See also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding that FGM constitutes past persecution that creates presumption of future 
persecution that the government cannot rebut with proof of a change in country condi-
tions). This case solidified the holding in Kasinga, showing that the U.S. law recognizes 
both future fear of FGM and past FGM as persecution. 
 38. Abebe I, 379 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004); Abay, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Olowo, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004); Azanor, 364 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2004); Oforji, 354 
F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003); Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2002). For a discussion of 
derivative asylum for parents within the framework of women refugees’ rights, see Ma-
rissa Farrone, Note, Opening the Doors to Women? An Examnination of Recent Devel-
opments in Asylum and Refugee Law, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 661, 684–89 (2006). 
 39. “Relief” is a term of art in immigration law that means that a citizen who is oth-
erwise deportable is granted relief from deportation and is permitted to remain in the 
United States. Depending on the form of relief granted, the conditions and durations vary. 
For a discussion of the theories of relief in these cases and for an argument in favor of 
statutory revision of the INA to provide for derivative status for parents of girls who face 
FGM, see Kimberly Sowders Blizzard, Note, A Parent’s Predicament: Theories of Relief 
for Deportable Parents of Children Who Face Female Genital Mutilation, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 899 (2006). 
 40. “Withholding of removal”—also called “restriction on removal” or “withholding 
of deportation”—is usually applied for, in the alternative, with an application for asylum. 
INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2006). The standard 
for asylum requires that a person have “well-founded fear” of future persecution. The 
Supreme Court held that a noncitizen need not show that it is “more likely than not” that 
she will be persecuted. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). Instead, fear 
that persecution is more than ten percent likely to occur is well-founded. Cordon-Garcia 
v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000). In contrast, withholding of removal involves a 
higher standard that requires the noncitizen to establish that it is “more likely than not 
that he or she would be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership 
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(CAT).41 One of the first circuit cases that addressed this issue was 
Nwaokolo v. Ashcroft in the Seventh Circuit in 2002.42 The asylum peti-
tioner in the case was a Nigerian woman who had been in the U.S. le-
gally, but had violated the employment terms of her visa and was ordered 
                                                                                                                                  
in a particular social group, or political opinion” if returned to his or her home country. 8 
C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (2006). In other words, the grounds for asylum and withholding are 
identical, but the standards of proof differ. This difference accounts for the fact that asy-
lum is a discretionary form of relief while withholding is not: when a noncitizen meets 
the statutory requirements of asylum, a judge may grant asylum; however, when a non-
citizen meets the statutory requirements of withholding, a judge cannot remove that per-
son to her home country. Compare INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) with 8 
C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). 
 41. Relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) is another form of relief 
(CAT relief) that is also usually applied for, in the alternative, with an application for 
asylum. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1988) (codified in 
U.S. law at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 208.18 (2006)) [hereinafter Convention Against Tor-
ture or CAT]. Like withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3), the standard for CAT relief is whether the applicant is “more likely than not” 
to be subjected to torture and, thus, is more strict than the “well-founded fear” standard of 
asylum status. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(4), 208.18. Also like withholding of removal, this 
form of relief is not discretionary and a person cannot be removed to a country where it is 
“more likely than not” that she will be tortured. 8 CFR § 208.16(d). However, CAT relief 
is more limited than either asylum or withholding under INA § 241(b)(3) because the 
torture in question must occur with the “consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 CFR § 208.18(a)(1). The fact that much 
FGM is performed by private persons and may not be officially sanctioned by the gov-
ernment can lead to problems in making an FGM claim for CAT relief. In contrast, “per-
secution” in the context of asylum and withholding of removal can be conducted by ei-
ther a public or private actor that the government is “unwilling or unable to control.” 
McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981). Both withholding of removal 
under INA § 241(b)(3) and CAT relief are less generous than asylum because these forms 
of relief merely prevent the person from being deported and are not accompanied by the 
privileges of asylum status. For example, after one year of living in the United States, an 
asylee can “adjust status” to that of a legal permanent resident (“greencard” holder). 8 
C.F.R. § 209.2 (2006). However, there is no similar provision for a person who is granted 
withholding of removal or CAT relief—meaning the person cannot become a legal per-
manent resident the same way. Clearly, asylum is the preferable status. However, often a 
noncitizen cannot apply for asylum because she has failed to apply for asylum within the 
one year provided by statute or because of a certain type of criminal conviction. INA §§ 
208(a)(2)(B), 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), 1158(b)(2)(A). In such cases, the 
noncitizen will apply for withholding of removal and CAT relief. As a result, cases of 
asylum, withholding of removal, and claims under CAT are all quite similar. Although 
this Note focuses on asylum, other forms of immigration relief are discussed because they 
are analogous to asylum and because the argument for derivative status for parents relates 
to all forms of relief. 
 42. Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d 303. 
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deported.43 Relying on a case called Salameda v. INS,44 the court rea-
soned that the petitioner’s youngest daughter, who was an American citi-
zen, would be “constructively deported” if the mother were deported be-
cause she was too young to remain alone in the United States and would 
have to accompany her mother.45 As a result, the Nwaokolo court granted 
a stay of removal46 because the INS failed to consider that the applicant’s 
U.S. citizen children might be subject to torture47 if their mother were 
deported to Nigeria.48 While this case did not hold that “constructive de-
portation” could give rise to a derivative asylum claim for a parent of a 
                                                                                                                                  
 43. Id. at 304. 
 44. Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995). Although unrelated to FGM, Sala-
meda held that where a minor “will have to follow his parents into exile . . . he is con-
structively deported and should therefore, one might suppose, be entitled to ask—or more 
realistically his parents’ lawyer should be entitled to ask on his behalf—for [relief].” Id. 
at 451. 
 45. Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d at 307–08. 
 46. A stay is defined as a “postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment, or the 
like.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (17th ed. 1999). In Nwaokolo, the petitioner’s 
order of deportation was stayed pending the resolution of her petition for review. 
Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d at 310. The term “removal” encompasses both deportation and ex-
clusion. INA § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2006). 
 47. The court suggested that FGM is torture within the meaning of the Convention 
Against Torture. Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d at 310. The position that FGM is torture was later 
confirmed by a statement by the Seventh Circuit: “It is undisputed that FGM as practiced 
in Nigeria constitutes ‘torture’ within the meaning of the CAT.” Oforji, F.3d 609, 615 
n.2. The first article of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as:  
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is in-
tentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an of-
ficial capacity . . . . This article is without prejudice to any international instru-
ment or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider ap-
plication. 
Convention Against Torture, supra note 41, art. 1. In the context of immigration relief, 
this definition was largely assumed by the corresponding Department of Justice regula-
tion. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) (2006). For an analysis of FGM cases in light of the relation-
ship between torture and family unification, see Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Tor-
ture, Family Reunification, and United States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 897, 
941–42 (2005). In addition, for a general discussion of gender and the U.S. approach to 
the CAT, see Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: 
United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2004). 
 48. Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d at 308. 
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child who would be subject to FGM, it did establish that the INS49 must 
consider the potential harm to a child when granting or denying immigra-
tion relief.50 
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit considered and rejected a similar case in-
volving derivative asylum in Oforji v. Ashcroft.51 This case concerned an 
asylum seeker from Nigeria with two U.S. citizen daughters. The mother 
herself had already undergone FGM and therefore did not fear this form 
of persecution herself. Instead she feared that her daughters would be 
subject to the practice if she were deported and they returned to Nigeria 
with her.52 The court stated: 
Oforji requests this court to “extend derivative asylum” to her based on 
“new expansions and considerations” reflected in case law such as 
Nwaokolo . . . and In Re Kasinga . . . . Oforji bases this request on her 
claim that “[t]his court has previously recognized that when an alien 
minor’s parent is deported, the minor will have to accompany the par-
ent into exile and is also effectively deported.”53 
The court dismissed this argument by distinguishing the case from the 
“constructive deportation” that was avoided in Salameda because the 
Nwaokolo children are citizens who have the legal right to remain in the 
United States.54 The court stated that, if the mother can locate the father 
(or, presumably, another caretaker) in the United States, the children may 
be able to avoid going to Nigeria with their mother.55 Essentially, the 
mother faced what Judge Manion, in his majority opinion, called the 
“distasteful Solomonic choice” between leaving her children behind or 
subjecting them to FGM in Nigeria.56 Still, the court was unable to pro-
                                                                                                                                  
 49. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 reclassified the INS and several other immi-
gration agencies under the control of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ). Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 
116 Stat. 2135. As a result, cases prior to that date refer to the INS, while subsequent 
cases refer to the DHS or DOJ. For a discussion of this restructuring, see David A. Mar-
tin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act Reorganization: An Early Agenda 
for Practical Improvements, 80 No. 17 INTERPRETER RELEASES 601 (2003). 
 50. Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d at 308–10.  
 51. Oforji, 354 F.3d 609. 
 52. Id. at 615. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 616. 
 56. Id. This statement is part of the majority opinion although, on the face of it, it 
sounds critical of the decision to deny relief in this case. Essentially, the court stated that 
the law is such that the “Solomonic choice” is the only option left to the mother in such a 
case. Judge Posner, in a concurring opinion, added that derivative asylum is logically 
impossible in this case since the children are U.S. citizens, and are therefore not eligible 
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vide relief, holding that parents are not eligible for derivative asylum 
status.57 
The Seventh Circuit again considered a case of this kind in Olowo v. 
Ashcroft in 2004.58 Like many in this line of cases, the petitioner was a 
national of Nigeria who had already been subjected to FGM and had two 
daughters. Before the Immigration Judge, and on appeal, Olowo claimed 
asylum on the basis that her children would have to return to Nigeria if 
she were deported and would then be forced to undergo FGM.59 The 
court, ostensibly relying on Oforji, suggested that a parent’s claim for 
derivative asylum is possible, stating that “claims for ‘derivative asylum’ 
based on potential harm to an applicant’s children are cognizable only 
when the applicant’s children are subject to ‘constructive deportation’ 
along with the applicant.”60 The court then cited the derivative asylum 
provision of the INA in support of this contention.61 However, the court 
found that Olowo did not qualify for derivative status because her chil-
dren were legal permanent residents and could not be “constructively 
deported.”62 In short, Olowo’s case failed because the court did not find 
that the children would be “constructively deported,” but the court did 
leave open the possibility that in circumstances where a child faced 
“constructive deportation,” a parent might be granted derivative asylum 
status.63 
                                                                                                                                  
for asylum because they have no need for it. Id. at 619 (Posner, J., concurring). As Posner 
pointed out, this distinction fails to have meaning because the children are in the same 
position as they would be if they were noncitizens granted asylum and their mother was 
deported: “although they are citizens they are treated as badly as aliens.” Id. at 620 (Pos-
ner, J., concurring). The logical problem of whether parents can derive asylum status 
from a U.S. citizen child will be addressed infra Part V. 
 57. Id. at 618. 
 58. Olowo, 368 F.3d 692. For an analysis of Olowo that advocates amending the INA 
to permit parents to receive derivative asylum, see Meredith Aherne, Comment, Olowo v. 
Ashcroft: Granting Parental Asylum on a Child’s Refugee Status, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 
317 (2006). 
 59. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 697. 
 60. Id. at 701. 
 61. Id.; INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3). 
 62. This decision suggests some disagreement about the difference between actual 
deportation and “constructive deportation” as elaborated in Salameda, 70 F.3d at 451. 
That case defined “constructive deportation” as a situation where minor children, who 
were legally free to remain in the United States, would be forced by necessity to follow a 
parent who was deported. Id. In Olowo, this outcome is exactly what the children faced 
because they would be forced to accompany their mother even though they were not 
themselves being legally deported. To that effect, Olowo argued that if she were de-
ported, her husband would be unable to care for her daughters on his own and they would 
have to return with her to Nigeria. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 698. 
 63. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701. 
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In May 2004, only eight days after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Olowo, the Sixth Circuit decided the case of Abay v. Ashcroft.64 In this 
case, the petitioner and her daughter were both citizens of Ethiopia.65 
Unlike Olowo, both the mother and the daughter applied for asylum on 
the grounds that they feared that the daughter would be subjected to 
FGM.66 Relying on the State Department Human Rights Country Report 
for Ethiopia67 that stated that FGM was “nearly universal” and testimony 
from the daughter, the Sixth Circuit easily concluded that the daughter 
had a well-founded fear of persecution vis-à-vis FGM.68 The case of the 
mother, Abay, however, was more problematic. The court did not con-
sider the argument of whether derivative asylum might be possible. In-
stead, it framed the question as follows: “The issue before the Court is 
really whether Abay can seek asylum in her own right based on a fear 
that her child will be subjected to female genital mutilation.”69 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that Abay “acknowledges that there is no express 
statutory authority for a parent to claim ‘derivative asylum’ based on her 
child’s asylee status” and cited the derivative asylum provision of the 
INA.70 It is not clear what the court would have held on the derivative 
asylum question because the court did not formulate the question in that 
way.71 
Instead, Abay argued that she was eligible for asylum because the BIA, 
in In re C-Y-Z, had previously held that a family member may be eligible 
for asylum if she witnessed harm to another family member.72 In light of 
the likelihood that the family would face ostracism if they refused to 
have the daughter subjected to FGM, the court agreed with Abay,73 citing 
a series of BIA decisions that granted withholding of removal74 to par-
ents who feared that their daughters would be forced to undergo FGM. In 
particular, the court relied upon In re Dibba, where the BIA granted re-
                                                                                                                                  
 64. Abay, 368 F.3d 634. 
 65. Id. at 635. 
 66. Id. at 636. 
 67. Id. at 369. 
 68. Id. at 640. 
 69. Id. at 641. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. The Abay court cited the following from a concurring opinion in In re C-Y-Z: “It 
not only constitutes persecution for the asylum applicant to witness or experience the 
persecution of family members, but it serves to corroborate his or her own fear of perse-
cution.” Abay, 368 F.3d at 641 (quoting In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 926–27 (BIA 
1997) (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring)). 
 73. Abay, 368 F.3d at 640–42. 
 74. See supra note 40 (discussing withholding of removal). 
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opening of a case to a petitioner so that she could proceed with an asy-
lum claim based on fear that a daughter would be subject to FGM. The 
BIA stated that “normally a mother would not be expected to leave her 
child in the United States in order to avoid persecution.”75 In concluding 
that Abay had a valid claim for asylum, the court stated that the prece-
dents “suggest a governing principle in favor of refugee status in cases 
where a parent and protector is faced with exposing her child to the clear 
risk of being subjected against her will to a practice that is a form of 
physical torture causing grave and permanent harm.”76 The court decided 
that the mother’s fear of being forced to return her daughter to Ethiopia 
and to witness her mutilation amounted to a well-founded fear of perse-
cution.77 
Also in 2004, the Ninth Circuit considered a similar claim in Azanor v. 
Ashcroft.78 In that case, the court noted that the question of whether a 
parent can assert a derivative claim on behalf of a child was one of first 
impression to the circuit and had not been decided.79 The petitioner was a 
Nigerian woman with a U.S. citizen daughter.80 The mother had already 
been subject to FGM and feared that the same would be forced upon her 
daughter if she were deported.81 Because of an untimely filing of her mo-
tion to reopen the case, the court denied review of her asylum claim.82 It 
did, however, hold that the BIA abused its discretion in not reopening her 
case to consider CAT relief83 based on the threat of FGM to her daugh-
ter.84 The court remanded the case to the BIA to decide, among other 
issues, any claim the mother might have to a derivative claim under 
CAT.85 To this affect, Judge Wallace, writing for the majority, stated: 
                                                                                                                                  
 75. Id. at 642 (citing In re Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (unpublished) (BIA Nov. 23, 
2001)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. In Abebe I, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Sixth Circuit held that Abay 
was eligible for asylum because she faced ostracism if she did not permit her daughter to 
be subjected to FGM. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 759. The Ninth Circuit then distinguished the 
cases by noting that ostracism did not rise to the level of persecution under Ninth Circuit 
case law and declined to follow the holding in Abay. Id. Although the Sixth Circuit did 
briefly discuss potential ostracism, the Abay court decided the case on the theory that 
witnessing harm to a family member amounted to persecution. Abay, 368 F.3d at 642. 
The Abay decision will be considered in greater depth infra Part IV. 
 78. Azanor, 364 F.3d 1013. 
 79. Id. at 1021. 
 80. Id. at 1016. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1018. 
 83. See supra note 41 (discussing CAT relief). 
 84. Azanor, 364 F.3d at 1021. 
 85. Id. 
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“Moreover, we should not decide whether an alien may assert a deriva-
tive torture claim on behalf of her United States citizen children—a ques-
tion of first impression in this circuit—without first allowing the Board 
to bring its considerable experience and expertise to bear on the issue.”86 
In essence, the court deferred to the BIA, but allowed for the possibility 
of a parent’s derivative claim by stating that it was a novel question for 
the courts and that prohibition of such a status was not a foregone con-
clusion. 
III. RECENT NINTH CIRCUIT CASES: ABEBE AND TCHOUKHROVA 
Despite Azanor’s holding that derivative asylum for parents was still 
an open question, the Ninth Circuit, in Abebe I, chose not to address the 
issue directly.87 As aforementioned, this case was decided by a panel of 
three judges,88 reheard en banc,89 and decided in late 2005.90 The case 
attracted a great deal of attention from asylee advocates91 and some de-
gree of attention from the press.92 Abebe involved Ethiopian parents who 
claimed asylum, in part, under the theory that their daughter would be 
subjected to FGM if the family were deported.93 The court suggested that 
the FGM claim presented a close case, but denied the petition for review 
of the deportation order on the basis that the parents would be able to 
protect the daughter from the mutilation.94 The court based this conclu-
sion on the fact that the parents failed to prove that the daughter’s subjec-
tion to FGM was “inevitable or even probable” because the parents 
stated they would do anything they could to prevent FGM.95 The court 
                                                                                                                                  
 86. Id. 
 87. Abebe I, 379 F.3d 755. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Abebe I, 400 F.3d 690 (granting rehearing en banc). 
 90. Abebe II, 432 F.3d 1037. 
 91. See Center for Gender and Refugee Stud., Advisory: Asylum, Withholding, and 
CAT Protection for Parents Who Oppose Female Genital Cutting [FGC], 2004, 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/legal/cgrs_advisory_FGC.doc; Marcelle Rice, Pro-
tecting Parents: Why Mothers and Fathers Who Oppose Female Genital Cutting Qualify 
for Asylum, 04-11 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 5–6, Nov. 2004, available at 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/legal/imm_briefings_11-04.pdf. 
 92. See Peter Blumberg, Judge Wonders When Genital Mutilation Might Be Ok, SAN 
FRAN. DAILY J., June 22, 2005, at 1, 5; David Watson, Couple Claiming Fear of Daugh-
ter’s Mutilation Gain En Banc Review of Ruling Denying Asylum Claim, METRO. NEWS, 
Mar. 4, 2005, available at: http://www.metnews.com/articles/2005/saka030405.htm. 
 93. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 756–57. 
 94. Id. at 759. The court referred to the FGM claim as a “closer case” in contrast to 
the father’s claim of political persecution, which the court rejected. Id. 
 95. Id. As Judge Ferguson pointed out in his dissent in Abebe I, this was an inappro-
priate standard. Id. at 760–61 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). He reasoned that the majority 
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also based this finding on a ten-year-old State Department document that 
stated that “women are able to prevent their daughters from being sub-
jected to [FGM] by relatives.”96 Furthermore, the court reasoned that 
even if the family faced ostracism for protecting the daughter from FGM, 
ostracism did not rise to the level of persecution under Ninth Circuit case 
law and could not be a ground for asylum.97 To that effect, the court fo-
cused on the issue of ostracism in explaining why it need not follow the 
result in Abay.98 In Abebe I, the court stated that Abay was not analogous 
because the Sixth Circuit recognized ostracism as persecution,99 but the 
Ninth did not.100 This point of distinction, however, is somewhat mis-
placed since Abay did not center on ostracism as a basis for the mother’s 
asylum claim, but instead focused on the fear experience of witnessing 
harm to one’s family member.101 In short, Abebe I rejected the reasoning 
of Abay and eschewed the derivative asylum argument.102 
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit decided Abebe II and again declined to ad-
dress the theory of derivative asylum directly.103 Instead, the court re-
manded the case to the BIA to address the question of derivative asylum 
for parents in the first instance.104 The court decided the case on a much 
narrower basis, holding that the Immigration Judge had erred in finding 
that the parents did not have a well-founded fear that their daughter 
would be subject to persecution.105 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the parents had made a prima facie case for asylum and remanded to the 
BIA to consider, in the first instance, if parents are eligible for derivative 
                                                                                                                                  
was incorrect in suggesting that the parents needed to prove that the FGM was probable 
or likely to occur. Id. Instead, Judge Ferguson, following the Supreme Court in INS v. 
Cardozo-Fonseca, quoted: “one can certainly have a well-founded fear of an even hap-
pening when there is less than a 50 percent chance of the occurrence taking place.” Id. 
(quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)). With this in mind, Judge 
Ferguson argued that the majority in Abebe I held the parents to an inappropriate standard 
and, even if it is likely that the parents can protect their daughter, “they may still have a 
well-founded fear of not being able to do so.” Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 761 (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting). 
 96. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 759 (citing U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, ETHIOPIA–PROFILE OF 
ASYLUM CLAIMS & COUNTRY CONDITIONS 5 (1994)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 759; Abay, 368 F.3d at 640. 
 100. Abebe I, 379 F. 3d at 759 (citing Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 
1995) (holding that ostracism does not rise to the level of persecution)). 
 101. Abay, 368 F.3d at 641–42. 
 102. Abebe I, 379 F. 3d at 759–60. 
 103. Abebe II, 432 F.3d at 1043. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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asylum.106 The case was very close, with only one vote affirming the de-
cision.107 To date, the BIA has not decided this issue108 
Shortly after agreeing to rehear Abebe en banc, but before announcing 
its decision, the Ninth Circuit decided Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales.109 Like 
Abebe, Tchoukhrova received attention from advocates of asylum seek-
ers110 and the disabled.111 In addition, news of the case appeared in the 
San Francisco Chronicle.112 Tchoukhrova differed from most of the 
                                                                                                                                  
 106. Commentary on this case has interpreted it to mean that the Ninth Circuit held 
that the parents were eligible for asylum. See, e.g., CGRS Wins en banc Genital Cutting 
Case–Abebe, Newsletter (Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, U.C. Hastings College 
of the Law, San Francisco, CA), Spring 2006, available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/new 
sletter/spring06/spring06.htm. Read literally, Abebe II actually remands the case to the 
BIA. Nevertheless, Judge Tallman, in his dissenting opinion in Abebe II, noted that the 
majority’s remand was illusory because the court did not dismiss the derivative claim as 
being without merit. Abebe II, 432 F.3d at 1048 (Tallman, J., dissenting). The decision to 
remand this issue to the BIA is based on the Supreme Court case of INS v. Ventura, 
which held that if an issue emerged in a circuit court that the executive agency’s adjudi-
catory bodies (the immigration judge and BIA) did not previously hear, the court must 
remand to allow the agency (here, the INS or DHS) to decide the matter in the first in-
stance. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002). To this effect, the Supreme Court held: 
“Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of 
a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.” Id. at 16. Further, the Court noted: 
“The agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; 
it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion 
and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the 
law provides.” Id. at 17. 
 107. Abebe II, 432 F.3d 1037. 
 108. A search for the remand of Abebe II on the Westlaw online database yielded no 
results. Westlaw Research Page, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). In 
addition, a search of the BIA’s online law library yielded no results. Virtual Law Library, 
Board of Immigration Appeals, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/lib_indecitnet.html 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2006). 
 109. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d 1181. 
 110. Deborah Anker, of the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic of Greater Bos-
ton Legal Services, circulated a memorandum against the rehearing. Memorandum from 
Deborah Anker on Tchoukhrova v. Gonzales, http://www.gbls.org/immigration/Tchoukhr 
ova_Memorandum_to_Interested_Parties_7-27-05.pdf [hereinafter Anker Memorandum]. 
In addition, Anker, along with Nancy Kelly and John Willshire-Carrera, filed an amicus 
brief in connection with the Tchoukhrova case. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner-Appellants and Opposing Rehearing en banc, Tchoukhrova v. Gonzazles, No. 
03-71129 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005). 
 111. Case Law Developments, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REPORTER 520, 
525 (2005). 
 112. Bob Egelko, Disabled Russian Boy, Family Given Asylum, SAN FRAN. CHRON., 
Apr. 22, 2005, at B3, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/04/22/ 
BAGGGCCHPH1.DTL. 
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cases in this Note because it did not involve FGM.113 However, it did 
address the question of derivative asylum for parents. After the case was 
decided in favor of the asylum applicants, the DOJ applied for a rehear-
ing en banc.114 In early December 2005, the court voted not to rehear the 
case.115 However, the government petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari in May 2006.116 In October 2006, the Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the case.117 
In Tchoukhrova, Victoria Tchoukhrova, the mother of a severely dis-
abled Russian boy, applied for asylum and named her son and her hus-
band as derivative beneficiaries.118 However, the person in this case who 
was the primary object of persecution was the child, Evgueni.119 His 
cerebral palsy was caused by the negligence of the Russian state-owned 
hospital when, in 1991, his mother was giving birth to him.120 The staff 
induced labor and then left the mother alone overnight, so that the child 
was still inside the womb and deprived of oxygen.121 Then, when the 
staff returned to deliver the child, they broke his neck in the process of 
extracting him.122 Telling his mother that “they didn’t see the reason why 
he needed to live,” they threw Evgueni into a medical waste container.123 
Evgueni lived and was removed from the medical waste bin.124 “Despite 
Victoria and her husband Dmitri’s attachment to their newborn son, gov-
ernment officials tried to intimidate the couple into abandoning him to a 
state-run orphanage. Notwithstanding his parents’ refusal to give their 
consent, Evgueni was transferred to an institution for orphaned children 
with birth defects.”125 Later, as a child, Evgueni was subject to verbal 
and physical assualts by strangers.126 Two attacks against him were so 
severe that Evgueni required hospitalization, but the police never investi-
gated the incidents.127 
                                                                                                                                  
 113. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d 1181. 
 114. Anker Memorandum, supra note 110. 
 115. Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d 1222, 1223. 
 116. Brief for the Petitioner, Tchoukhrova III, 127 S. Ct. 57 (No. 05–1401). 
 117. Tchoukhrova III, 127 S. Ct. 57. 
 118. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1187. 
 119. Id. at 1184–87. 
 120. Id. at 1184. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1184. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1184–85. 
 126. Id. at 1185. 
 127. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit, in deciding Tchoukhrova, was faced with a very 
compelling set of facts and it is not surprising that the court ruled in fa-
vor of the family. However, rather than advance the argument of deriva-
tive asylum for parents, the court decided the case under a different the-
ory. First, the court held that Evgueni was a member of a particular so-
cial group of disabled children who faced persecution on account of their 
disabilities.128 Then the court turned to the question of whether a parent 
could receive derivative asylum through her child.129 In the first defini-
tive statement by a majority opinion in the Ninth Circuit, the court inter-
preted the silence of the INA on derivative asylum for parents to mean 
that such status was not legally permissible.130 Instead, the court stated: 
“[I]f the child is the principal applicant and is granted asylum, the child 
can legally stay in this county, but his parents will be removed.”131 The 
court then recognized the dilemma inherent in such a rule: “Facing im-
minent removal, parents could be forced to make a choice between aban-
doning their child in the United States or taking him to a country where it 
is likely that he will be persecuted.”132 
In resolving the case, the court found a creative way to effectively 
grant asylum to the parents without literally calling it derivative asylum. 
The court concluded that parents of disabled children are part of the same 
particular social group as their children because the parent-child relation-
ship is “immutable.”133 Then the court held that asylum claims of family 
members within this particular social group should be considered as a 
unit and that harm to one member of the family may be imputed to the 
entire family unit.134 Therefore, the harm to Euvegni could be imputed to 
his mother. To this effect, the court stated: 
Taken as a whole, the harm to which Evgueni was subjected unques-
tionably rose to the level of persecution. Because this persecution is 
properly considered when adjudicating his mother’s claim, we hold that 
Victoria [the mother] has suffered past persecution, and note that the 
same would be true whichever parent was the principal applicant.135 
                                                                                                                                  
 128. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1188–89. 
 129. Id. at 1190–91. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1189–90. 
 134. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1192. 
 135. Id. at 1195. The term “principal applicant” refers to the person applying for asy-
lum—in this case, Evgueni’s mother. The finding of past persecution is significant here 
because past persecution creates a presumption of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 
208.13(b)(1) (2006). However, this presumption can be rebutted by the Government with 
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In other words, the court concluded that Evgueni’s persecution could 
be imputed to his mother, making her eligible for asylum. Then, in a 
strange and circular twist, Evgueni and his father became eligible for 
derivative asylum status as the son and husband of Victoria. The court 
achieved the same outcome that would have resulted from holding that 
parents were eligible for derivative asylum. However, the implications of 
granting on the Tchoukhrova theory are not the same as those that flow 
from a derivative asylum approach.136 
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH REQUIRING PERSECUTION OF THE PARENT 
The result of not extending derivative asylum to parents is that courts 
must find that the parent fears persecution in her own right. The Sixth 
Circuit in Abay and the Ninth in Tchoukhrova have granted137 cases of 
this type, and in both cases, declined to hold that the parents are eligible 
for derivative status.138 Both decisions present problematic legal and 
practical implications. 
The Sixth Circuit approach in Abay was to find that the mother’s fear 
of being unable to prevent and having to witness her daughter’s mutila-
tion constituted persecution.139 This assertion presumes that persecution 
can be purely psychological and fear of harm to another or fear of wit-
nessing harm to another constitutes persecution. This issue is compli-
cated by the fact that the INA does not define the term “persecution.” 
                                                                                                                                  
a showing that changed circumstances make the fear of future persecution unfounded. Id. 
Yet, certain forms of past persecution have been found to be so severe that even an ab-
sence of a fear of future persecution cannot bar a grant of relief from deportation. See In 
re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (BIA 1989) (holding that a favorable grant of discretion 
may be warranted on humanitarian grounds in certain extreme cases even if there is little 
likelihood of future persecution). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2006). In 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit found that the experience of past FGM is an 
ongoing harm that may entitle the applicant to relief even if she does not fear future 
FGM. Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 802. 
 136. This point will be discussed infra Part IV. 
 137. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d 1181; Abay, 368 F.3d 634. Technically, the circuit courts 
do not grant or deny asylum claims; only executive officials within the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice have the authority to grant asylum. 
INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). A circuit court reviews the deci-
sions of the executive bodies below (the immigration judge and the BIA) and remands the 
case to the BIA, which has the authority to grant or deny the claim. See, e.g., Abay, 368 
F.3d at 642–43 (remanding the case to the BIA “for further consideration in light of our 
conclusions”). 
 138. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1191–92; Abay, 368 F.3d at 641. 
 139. Abay, 368 F.3d at 642–43. For a criticism of the reasoning in Abay, see Wes Hen-
ricksen, Comment, Abay v. Ashcroft: The Sixth Circuit’s Baseless Expansion of INA § 
101(a)(42)(A) Revealed a Gap in Asylum Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 477 (2005). 
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There is ample, often contradictory, case law on the meaning of this 
word in the context of asylum. For example, according to the BIA in In 
re Acosta, prior to the 1980 Refugee Act,140 the term meant “either a 
threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon 
those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.”141 Acosta concluded: 
As was the case prior to the enactment of the [1980] Refugee Act, “per-
secution” as used in section 101(a)(42)(A) [the refugee/asylee defini-
tion] clearly contemplates that harm or suffering must be inflicted upon 
an individual in order to punish him for possessing a belief or charac-
teristic a persecutor seeks to overcome.142  
In general, persecution tends to signify serious threats to life or freedom. 
For instance, the Ninth Circuit stated: “This circuit has defined persecu-
tion as ‘the infliction of suffering or harm’ upon those who differ (in 
race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.”143 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that “persecution . . . is an extreme 
concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards 
as offensive.”144 Likewise the Seventh Circuit has held that persecution 
may occur from acts such as “detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecu-
tion, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, surveil-
lance, beatings, or torture.”145 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has suggested 
that ostracism may rise to the level of persecution.146 
                                                                                                                                  
 140. The 1980 Refugee Act brought U.S. law into compliance with its obligations un-
der the 1967 Protocol on Refugees. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, 94 Stat. 
102; 1967 Protocol, supra note 1. 
 141. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222–23. 
 142. Id. The requirement that the persecution must be intended to punish a person or 
overcome a certain characteristic she possesses does not fit well in the context of FGM, 
where the persecutors do not generally view their act as punishment or harm. As a result, 
FGM cases do not require that the perpetrator have the intent to persecute, harm, or pun-
ish. See Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365. For a different approach, compare the concur-
rence of BIA Board Member Rosenberg, where she argued that the requirement of intent 
does apply to FGM because the procedure is intended to overcome the applicant’s state of 
being “non-mutilated and accordingly, free from male-dominated tribal control.” Id. at 
374 (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring). 
 143. Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Ghaly v. INS, 58 
F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995)). Both Korablina and Ghaly refer to the language used in 
In re Acosta. 
 144. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 758 (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 
1993)). 
 145. Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995), followed by Oforji, 354 F.3d 
609. 
 146. Abay, 368 F.3d at 640. 
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In Abay, the court suggested that the mental harm of witnessing her 
daughter’s mutilation rose to the level of persecution.147 However, given 
the diversity of opinion among the circuits as to the meaning of persecu-
tion, it is doubtful that other circuits will follow the logic of Abay and 
hold that the mental harm is persecution. Those who support the ap-
proach in Abay and argue that mental harm is persecution cite instances 
where courts have granted asylum when the persecution was not physi-
cal.148 For instance, Marcelle Rice, in an article in Immigration Briefings, 
cited Kovac v. INS, where the Ninth Circuit found that persecution was 
not limited to physical acts.149 However, that case is not entirely apropos 
because it concerned economic harm and did not consider mental or psy-
chological harm.150 Generally, where the courts have considered the 
question of mental harm, they have held that it may be a significant as-
pect of persecution,151 but only when coupled with physical harm or a 
threat of physical harm.152 
The argument in Abay that mental harm could constitute persecution 
relied on In re C-Y-Z, where the BIA granted withholding of deporta-
tion153 to a man because his wife had undergone forced sterilization as a 
part of China’s coercive family planning program.154 The Abay decision 
quoted the following section of In re C-Y-Z as an analogy to Abay’s 
claim: “It not only constitutes persecution for the asylum applicant to 
witness or experience the persecution of family members, but it serves to 
corroborate his or her own fear of persecution.”155 However, this section 
of the decision is part of a concurring opinion; the majority holding in In 
re C-Y-Z is narrower and does not focus on the element of mental harm 
                                                                                                                                  
 147. Id. at 641–42. 
 148. See Rice, supra note 91. 
 149. Id.; Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105–07 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 150. Id. at 107. 
 151. See, e.g., Shoaira v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
asylum applicant’s experience of witnessing her father’s forcible arrests on four occa-
sions, which led to post-traumatic stress disorder, did not rise to the level of persecution, 
but acknowledging that mental harm may be an aspect of persecution). 
 152. See, e.g., Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that “the physical and mental abuse he experienced is wholly consistent with the docu-
mentary evidence introduced by the INS and compels the conclusion that he was a victim 
of persecution”). In reviewing the precedent cases, there is no evidence that mental harm 
alone may rise to the level of persecution. A search of BIA and circuit court cases did not 
yield any examples, but, since some BIA decisions are not published, the author of this 
Note is unwilling to state conclusively that no such case exists. 
 153. This relief is synonymous with withholding of removal or restriction on removal. 
See supra note 40 (discussing the withholding of removal). 
 154. In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997). 
 155. Id. at 926–27 (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring); Abay, 368 F.3d at 641. 
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caused by witnessing harm to a family member. Instead, In re C-Y-Z held 
that “the husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand in her shoes 
and make a bona fide and non-frivolous application for asylum based on 
problems impacting more intimately on her than him.”156 
Thus, one potential shortcoming of the Abay argument that mental 
harm is persecution is that other circuits will resist following it because 
its reasoning stretches and dilutes the definition of persecution. The Abay 
decision extrapolated from a concurring opinion in In re C-Y-Z and prof-
fered a broad interpretation of persecution that included purely mental 
harm. Although this holding is within the jurisprudence of the Sixth Cir-
cuit, it does not necessarily apply to other circuits that define persecution 
more narrowly.157 For instance, as aforementioned, in Abebe I, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged the holding in Abay, but explicitly declined to fol-
low it, in part, because ostracism did not conform to their circuit’s con-
ception of persecution.158 To date, no other circuit court has followed the 
holding of Abay.159 
The practical result of proceeding on the Abay theory is that it fails to 
put proper emphasis on the child and, as a result, may fail to protect the 
child. The child’s protection is dependent on the parents’ ability to show 
that they themselves fear persecution. If the parents cannot convince an 
Immigration Judge or a court that their mental harm amounts to persecu-
tion, U.S. asylum law cannot protect the best interest of the child because 
her parents must choose between abandoning her or returning her to 
harm. In either case, the best interest of the child is not protected. In ad-
dition, requiring parents to make a showing of their own persecution 
complicates what might otherwise be a simple case: the case for granting 
asylum to the child may be solid, but the more tenuous claims of the par-
ents must also be advanced and adjudicated. The result is to place an un-
                                                                                                                                  
 156. In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 918 (majority opinion) (quoting Memorandum 
from the Office of the General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 4 
(Oct. 21, 1996)). 
 157. The Sixth Circuit has tended to take a comparatively broad approach to the defini-
tion of persecution. For instance, the court in Abay suggested that ostracism might be a 
form of persecution, but the Ninth Circuit rejected that proposition in Abebe I. See supra 
text accompanying note 72 and compare to supra text accompanying notes 97–102. 
 158. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 759. 
 159. Apart from the Ninth, other circuits have not directly addressed the issue of 
whether mental harm of this kind may rise to the level of persecution. The Seventh Cir-
cuit cited Abay in Liu v. Ashcroft, but cited in relation to a different issue. Liu v. 
Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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necessary burden160 on the court system by adding additional claimants 
and layers of legal complexity. 
In contrast to Abay’s focus on mental harm, Tchoukhrova maintained 
that harm to one person could be imputed to the family unit.161 In 
Tchoukhrova, the Ninth Circuit held that “disabled children and their 
parents constitute a statutorily protected group and that a parent who 
provides care for a disabled child may seek asylum and withholding of 
removal on the basis of the persecution that the child has suffered on ac-
count of his disability.”162 The court may have considered the question in 
this way because, arguably, nothing suffered by the parents of Evgueni 
constituted persecution per se.163 In particular, the court held that prece-
dent on derivative asylum has not “formalistically divided the claims 
between ‘principal’ and ‘derivative’ applicants but instead, without dis-
cussion, have simply viewed the family as a whole.”164 Therefore, “a 
parent of a disabled child may file as a principal applicant in order to 
prevent the child’s forced return to the family’s home country and may 
establish her asylum claim on the basis of the persecution inflicted on or 
feared by the child.”165 
The problem with the argument that persecution of one person is per-
secution of the family unit is similar to the problem with the Abay argu-
ment that mental harm is persecution: both decisions take an idiosyn-
cratic approach to the very notion of persecution. In the case of Tchouk-
hrova, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the lack of an express statute 
making parents eligible for derivative status is a formalistic procedural 
problem that can be overcome by treating the family as a unit.166 In sup-
port of this position, the Tchoukhrova court cited a series of cases where 
the court treated the family as a whole in the context of an asylum 
                                                                                                                                  
 160. “Unnecessary” because it could be avoided by following the derivative asylum 
argument. See infra Part V. 
 161. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1190–92. 
 162. Id. at 1184. 
 163. The parents were not permitted to see their son for two months and, when they 
were, they found the conditions in the institution “horrifying.” Id. at 1185. After their son 
was released, they were denied any public medical support because he was labeled as 
permanently disabled. Id. As a result of their experiences, the parents became advocates 
for disabled children in Russia. Id. at 1186. This activism led to further problems with 
society: people threw stones at the mother and vandalized their car, the father was fired, 
and at subsequent job interviews he was told to stop advocating for the rights of disabled 
children. Id. at 1186. Judge Kozinski, in his dissent to the decision not to rehear the case, 
wrote, “the harms suffered directly by Victoria are clearly not enough to amount to per-
secution.” Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d at 1225 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 164. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1192. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1191–92. 
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claim.167 However, none of the cited cases contemplated a situation 
where the persecution of a child was imputed to a parent, or considered 
to constitute harm to the entire family unit.168 In other words, even 
though the decision cited many cases as bases for its conclusion, the 
holding in Tchoukhrova created a novel conception of persecution to the 
family unit. To this effect, Judge Kozinski, in his dissenting opinion to 
the later decision not to rehear Tchoukhrova en banc, wrote: 
By allowing the harms suffered by a child to be imputed to the parent, 
the panel in effect creates a reverse derivative asylum claim . . . . This 
exotic reading of the immigration statute was never discussed by the 
[Immigration Judge], the BIA or even the parties—rather, it is some-
thing the panel comes up with on its own.169 
Had courts actually taken the approach that Tchoukhrova suggests they 
did and treat families as a unit, the discourse on the question of deriva-
tive asylum for parents—spanning from Nwaokolo to Abebe—would 
have been unnecessary. If immigration judges and circuit courts had con-
sidered harm to one family member as harm to the unit, they could have 
granted those cases without much discussion. 
In addition, the decision not to rehear Tchoukhrova succeeded very 
narrowly; six of his fellow judges joined Judge Kozinski in his dissenting 
opinion.170 Judge Kozinski argued that the Tchoukhrova decision was 
flawed because it expanded the notion of family as particular social 
group. To this effect, Judge Kozinski wrote: “[F]inding that a group was 
persecuted doesn’t mean that every member of the group was persecuted. 
Rather, once an asylum petitioner has shown that he is a member of a 
persecuted group, he must still show that he himself has suffered or is 
likely to suffer persecution.”171 In contrast, the Tchoukhrova court did 
not consider whether the mother suffered persecution by virtue of being 
in the particular social group of parents of disabled children in Russia.172 
Judge Kozinski maintained that it is important to consider the harms to 
                                                                                                                                  
 167. Id. at 1192. In particular, the court cited: Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 660 
(9th Cir. 2004); Maini v. INS, 212 F.3d 1167, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000); Singh v. INS, 94 
F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 168. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1191–92. 
 169. Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d at 1223 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). “Panel” in his quote 
refers to the three-member panel that decided Tchoukhrova. In addition, Judge Kozinski 
referred to the “immigration statute” in this way because he concluded that a certain regu-
lation about refugees statutorily precludes the possibility that parents can receive deriva-
tive asylum. See infra note 197 for a discussion of Judge Kozinski’s argument. 
 170. Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d at 1223–27 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 1124 (emphasis in original). 
 172. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1191–92. 
256 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:1 
all family members in order to identify the particular social group, but 
the harms may not be considered cumulatively.173 The strength of Judge 
Kozinski’s dissent and the amount of support it garnered among his peers 
indicate that courts might hesitate to follow the Tchoukhrova decision 
because its family unit argument is idiosyncratic and overly broad. To 
that effect, the Ninth Circuit itself declined to follow its own reasoning in 
Tchoukhrova when it decided Abebe II in favor of the asylum appli-
cants.174 The court could have easily relied upon its reasoning in Tchouk-
hrova and held that the harm to the Abebes’ daughter was harm to the 
entire family unit. They declined to do so.175 Instead, the court only cited 
Tchoukhrova in relation to the proper standard of review.176 The court 
may not have found the reasoning in Tchoukhrova to be persuasive. 
In addition, as Kozinksi noted in his dissent, Tchoukhrova bypassed 
the derivative asylum statute and rendered it ineffectual: the statute has 
no meaning if harm to one family member can be imputed, cumulatively, 
to the entire unit and every family member becomes eligible for asylum. 
In support of this contention, Judge Kozinski stated: 
By assessing the harms cumulatively, the panel moots this carefully 
drawn statutory scheme, and obviates the need for derivative status in 
the first place. Under the panel’s reasoning, section 1158(b)(3) [the de-
rivative asylum provision] becomes mere surplusage, since the spouse 
and children of the principal applicant will themselves file as principal 
applicants once the familiar harms are assessed “cumulatively.” This is 
all very new law.177 
Not only does the Tchoukhrova decision undermine the statute, as 
Judge Kozinski argued, it also has the potential to make some sort of 
                                                                                                                                  
 173. Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d at 1225–26 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). After deciding 
Tchoukhrova I, the Ninth Circuit held in Thomas v. Gonzales that family may constitute a 
social group. Thomas v. Gonzales (Thomas I), 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005), va-
cated by Gonzales v. Thomas (Thomas II), 126 S. Ct. 1613 (2006). See also infra text 
accompanying note 182 (discussing Thomas I). Unlike in Tchoukhrova I, in Thomas I, the 
court did not “cumulate” the harm, but considered the treatment of the individual. Tho-
mas I, 409 F.3d at 1188–89. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Cir-
cuit and remanded, holding that the court of appeals must remand the case to the BIA to 
decide the issue of whether a family constitutes a particular social group. Thomas II, 126 
S. Ct. 1613. 
 174. Abebe II, 432 F.3d at 1040–43. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1040–42. 
 177. Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d at 1225 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
Judge Kozinski’s reference to the “carefully drawn statutory scheme” again refers to his 
contention that parents are statutorily excluded from derivative asylum. See infra note 
197 for a discussion of Judge Kozinski’s argument. 
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quasi-derivative asylum available to anyone who can prove she is a 
member of a family unit in which at least one member is persecuted. One 
logical consequence is that courts will now have to grapple with the defi-
nition of family unit in order to limit the potential scope of this decision 
and avoid abuse of the system. In short, by reading the derivative asylum 
statute literally as to exclude parents, the court stripped the statute of any 
meaning. 
Thus, like the mental harm argument in Abay, it is unlikely that other 
courts will follow the Tchoukhrova court’s theory concerning persecu-
tion of the family unit. The Supreme Court’s recent decision to vacate 
and remand the case178 only makes the future of Tchoukhrova more un-
certain. The Court remanded the case to be considered in light of its deci-
sion in Gonzales v. Thomas.179 That case also originated in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.180 In June 2005—two months after the panel decision in Tchouk-
hrova—the Ninth Circuit held in Thomas that a family may constitute a 
social group.181 The case involved individual members of a white family 
in South Africa who were persecuted by black South Africans because of 
their family relationship to an allegedly racist boss.182 In April 2006, the 
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded, 
instructing the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the BIA to decide, 
in the first instance, whether family may constitute a particular social 
group.183 Although the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly rely on this case in 
denying the rehearing of Tchoukhrova, its existence as precedent may 
have bolstered the petitioners’ claim that family could be a social group 
in that case. As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas desta-
bilized the Ninth Cicuit’s decision in Tchoukhrova, making a remand the 
likely result in the latter case. In sum, the reasoning in Tchoukhrova has 
not proved to be persuasive and it is unlikely that the BIA will adopt this 
approach when considering the issue of derivative asylum for parents. 
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR GRANTING DERIVATIVE ASYLUM TO PARENTS 
In contrast to the approaches in Abay and Tchoukhrova, the argument 
that parents are eligible for derivative asylum is straightforward, easy to 
                                                                                                                                  
 178. Tchoukhrova III, 127 S. Ct. 57. 
 179. Id.; Thomas I, 409 F.3d at 1187. 
 180. Thomas I, 409 F.3d at 1187. 
 181. Id. at 1188–89. 
 182. Id. at 1188. 
 183. Thomas II, 126 S. Ct. at 1615. This decision was also based on the holding in 
Ventura, that the courts cannot decide factual or legal issues in the first instance, but must 
instead remand the case to the BIA for the agency to first decide the matter. Ventura, 537 
U.S. at 17. See also supra note 106. 
258 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:1 
administer, and, most importantly, legally coherent. Until Tchoukhrova 
stated that derivative immigration status was not available to parents,184 it 
was considered an open question in the Ninth Circuit.185 Both the BIA or 
the Circuits could have decided the cases by holding that the derivative 
asylum statute applied to parents, but declined to do so. However, the 
dissenting opinions in several of these cases indicate that there is no clear 
consensus that parents are ineligible for derivative asylum status. 
For instance, in Abebe I, Judge Ferguson’s dissent stridently disagreed 
with the majority for not reaching the question of derivative asylum.186 
He stated that he would hold that the parents in the Abebe case qualify 
for asylum through their daughter.187 He argued that failing to grant the 
case along these lines is a “misreading of the law and an affront to basic 
human values.”188 The dissent recalled the case of Azanor189 and the fact 
that the Ninth Circuit remanded it to the BIA because the issue of a de-
rivative torture claim was an issue of first impression that the BIA should 
decide.190 Similarly, in another 2004 Ninth Circuit decision, Mansour v. 
Ashcroft,191 Judge Pregerson’s dissent closely followed the reasoning of 
Judge Ferguson in Abebe I.192 First, he stated: “Whether aliens in re-
moval proceedings may assert a derivative claim for relief from removal 
on behalf of their U.S. citizen children is an open question in this Cir-
cuit.”193 Likewise, Judge Pregerson wrote: “[A]s our colleague, Judge 
Ferguson, persuasively reasoned . . . this is a question that should be an-
swered in favor of recognition of a derivative claim.”194 Furthermore, in 
favor of the derivative asylum argument, he wrote: “I share Judge Fergu-
son’s view and would hold that Petitioners may derivatively claim relief 
                                                                                                                                  
 184. Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1191–92. 
 185. Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 682 (9th Cir. 2004) (Pregerson, J., dissent-
ing); Azanor, 364 F.3d 1013, 1021. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit considered it an open 
question until holding otherwise in Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618. 
 186. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 762 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 764. 
 188. Id. at 762. 
 189. Azanor, 364 F.3d 1013. 
 190. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 762 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Azanor, 364 F.3d at 
1021). 
 191. Mansour, 390 F.3d 667. The case involved Coptic Christian parents from Egypt 
who claimed that they feared that their U.S. citizen children would be persecuted for 
being Copts if the family were returned to Egypt. The majority rejected the parents’ peti-
tion for review, stating that the discrimination that the asylum applicant faced did not 
amount to persecution. Id. at 672–74. The majority did not consider the question of de-
rivative status for the parents. Id. 
 192. Id. at 682–83. (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 682. 
 194. Mansour, 390 F.3d at 682. 
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from removal because they have a well-founded fear that their U.S. citi-
zen children will be persecuted if Petitioners and their family are forced 
to return to Egypt.”195 
In Abebe I, Judge Ferguson based his argument that parents could re-
ceive derivative asylum, in part, on an analysis of the derivative asylum 
statute.196 He argued that the statutory silence of the INA’s derivative 
asylum provision vis-à-vis parents does not foreclose the possibility of 
granting such status.197 This interpretation is supported by other instances 
where the courts have concluded that silence in the INA does not indicate 
that a particular interpretation is precluded. For instance, the INA has 
separate sections on inadmissibility and deportation.198 Section 212(h) 
provides for a waiver for certain grounds of inadmissibility.199 Thus, a 
person can request a waiver if she is found inadmissible. Section 212(h) 
does not mention deportation at all. However, courts have interpreted the 
212(h) waiver to apply to deportation as well as inadmissibility because 
the noncitizen in a deportation proceeding is “similarly situated” to one 
                                                                                                                                  
 195. Id. 
 196. The provision states: “A spouse or child . . . of an alien who is granted asylum 
under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for asylum under this section, be 
granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien.” 
INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(2006). 
 197. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 762–63 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). In contrast, Judge Kozin-
ski, in his dissenting opinion in the decision not to rehear Tchoukhrova en banc, main-
tained that derivative asylum for parents was expressly prohibited by an immigration 
regulation. Tchoukhrova II, 430 F.3d at 1223. The regulation Judge Kozinski cited is 
titled “Derivatives of refugees.” 8 C.F.R. § 207.7(b) (2006). The regulation expressly 
names parents as ineligible for receiving derivative refugee status. However, as its name 
suggests, the regulation is about refugees—not asylees. Accordingly, there is another 
regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations that addresses the admission of an asylee’s 
spouse and children. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21 (2006). Like the derivative asylum statute in the 
INA, this regulation on asylees is silent as to the question of derivative status for parents. 
Id. Had the Department of Justice intended the refugee regulation to apply to both refu-
gees and asylees, it would not have promulgated a separate asylum regulation. Moreover, 
the regulation that Judge Kozinski cited is not cited by any other case mentioned in this 
Note as authority that parents are ineligible for derivative asylum status. 
 198. A person may be found inadmissible on certain enumerated grounds (such as 
criminal conduct or contagious diseases) when she applies for admission to the United 
States. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006). In addition, inadmissibility grounds 
apply to the case of a noncitizen present in the United States who attempts to adjust her 
status to that of a legal permanent resident. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006). 
However, a person may be found deportable if she is already legally within the United 
States, but commits some act that is a ground for deportation. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 
1227 (2006). As the statute numbers suggest, these two provisions are found in different 
sections of the code and the grounds of inadmissibility and deportation, despite some 
overlap, are not the same. 
 199. INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006). 
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in an inadmissibility proceeding.200 In this sense, the courts have shown 
that silence in the INA does not mean that what is omitted, necessarily, is 
forbidden. Using the same logic as the courts vis-à-vis the 212(h) waiver, 
it can be argued that a parent of an asylum seeker is “similarly situated” 
to a child of an asylum seeker and the derivative asylum statute should 
apply to both.201 
Judge Ferguson specifically considered the silence of the INA on the 
question of derivative asylum for parents and concluded that Congress 
could not have intended for a parent to choose between leaving a daugh-
ter alone in the United States and taking her back to her home country 
where she might suffer FGM.202 He was highly critical of the majority’s 
position that Congress ‘“has opted to leave the choice with the illegal 
immigrant, not with the courts.”’203 When arguing that the statutory si-
lence does not forbid the possibility of derivative asylum for parents, 
Judge Ferguson wrote: 
I do not believe that Congress intended any parent to face that choice. 
If Congress failed to clarify, in so many words, that a parent may claim 
asylum on the basis of a threat to her child, that omission is attributable 
only to a failure to imagine that so many young children would be in-
dependently targeted for persecution. Our consciousness of FGM has 
now grown, as has our knowledge that hundreds of thousands of chil-
dren are compelled to serve as child soldiers in deadly conflicts around 
the world.204 
                                                                                                                                  
 200. Jankowski-Burczyk v. INS, 291 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that the 
212(h) waiver applies to noncitizens in deportation proceedings). The same was the case 
for a waiver under former section 212(c) of the INA. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) 
(1995). See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (extending applicability of the 
212(c) waiver to deportation proceedings). 212(c) relief was repealed with the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996., Pub. L. No. 104–208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (2006)). Although that form of 
relief was repealed, it was another instance where courts “read into” a silence in the INA. 
 201. This Note argues that, in a narrow set of circumstances, parents should receive 
derivative status, but that such grants should be limited by the same age restrictions that 
govern derivative status for children. A child of an asylee can only receive derivative 
asylum status as long as she is a child within the meaning of the INA—in other words, an 
unmarried child under the age of twenty-one. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) 
(2006). Reciprocally, a child should only be able to provide derivative status to her parent 
as long as she is a child within the meaning of the INA. Limiting the grant of the deriva-
tive status in this way is still in keeping with the purpose of granting the status to a par-
ent: protecting the child when she may not be able to protect herself. 
 202. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 763 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. at 763 (quoting Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618). 
 204. Id. at 763. 
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In other words, Judge Ferguson concluded that the INA’s statutory si-
lence with regard to parents was not the result of a deliberate decision to 
exclude parents, but an inability to imagine that it would be necessary to 
do so. Judge Ferguson concluded that it would be inappropriate to deny a 
grant of derivative asylum to parents simply because Congress could not 
have envisioned the need to expressly mention parents. Instead, the si-
lence of the statute can be interpreted as leaving room for the interpreta-
tion that parents are eligible for derivative asylum in certain circum-
stances. Judge Ferguson also relied on Abay’s holding that earlier cases 
“suggest a governing principle in favor of refugee status in cases where a 
parent and protector is faced with exposing her child to the clear risk of 
being subjected against her will to a practice that is a form of physical 
torture causing grave and permanent harm.”205 In this way, Judge Fergu-
son’s dissent also has echoes of the notion of “constructive deportation” 
discussed by the Seventh Circuit.206 
Furthermore, not granting derivative asylum status to parents in these 
circumstances conflicts with one of the major underlying policies of U.S. 
immigration law: family unity.207 As Judge Ferguson stated in Abebe I, 
“U.S. immigration law prioritizes the value of keeping families together. 
Family reunification is the ‘dominant feature of current arrangements for 
permanent immigration to the United States,’ with special preferences for 
the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.”208 Another example of the pre-
mium that immigration law places on family unity is the fact that several 
                                                                                                                                  
 205. Id. at 762–64 (citing Abay, 368 F.3d at 642). 
 206. Nwaokolo, 314 F.3d at 307–08. See also supra Part II (discussing “constructive 
deportation”). 
 207. For example, the goal of keeping families united is furthered by the rather broad 
definition of “child” that includes step-children and adopted children. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2006). The emphasis on family in the INA can also be seen in tem-
porary, nonimmigrant, visas, such as fiancé visas, and student or worker visas that allow 
the spouse and minor children of the person to accompany the student or worker for their 
duration of stay in the United States. INA § 101(a)(15)(K), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(K) 
(2006) (fiancé visa); INA § 101(a)(15)(F), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(F) (2006) (student visa); 
INA § 101(a)(15)(H), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(H) (2006) (work visa). For a discussion of 
family unity and immigration law in relation to torture claims, see generally Nessel, 
“Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad: United States’ Implementation of 
Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against Torture, supra note 47. 
 208. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 764. (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (quoting THOMAS ALEXANDER 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 319 (4th ed. 
1998)); INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2006). Judge Ferguson also cited the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois, where the Court held: “The rights to conceive and to 
raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential, basic civil rights of man’ and ‘rights far 
more precious . . . than property rights.” Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 763. (Ferguson, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 
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types of waivers and relief require that the noncitizen prove that there 
would be hardship to an American citizen child if the family were re-
turned.209 In other words, the body of immigration law shows a prefer-
ence for keeping families united. To interpret the provision as not permit-
ting derivative asylum for parents in these extreme circumstances is in-
consistent with the overall character of the INA.210 However, derivative 
asylum status should not be available to the siblings or other family 
members of the persecuted child. The focus should be on protecting the 
principal applicant for asylum and allowing that child to remain in the 
care of her parents. 
In addition to being legally coherent and preferable to interpret the de-
rivative asylum statute to apply to parents, to do so also comports with 
international law on children and refugees. In particular, Judge Ferguson 
cited the Convention on the Rights of the Child,211 which, even though 
Somalia and the United States have not ratified it, is the most widely rati-
fied treaty in history.212 Ferguson noted that the Convention requires 
                                                                                                                                  
 209. One example is the 212(h) waiver described supra text accompanying notes 199–
201. That waiver requires that a noncitizen make a showing that her spouse, parent, or 
child, who is a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident, would suffer extreme hardship if 
the noncitizen were denied admission or deported. INA § 212(h)(B). In addition, cancel-
lation of removal, a type of relief that literally “cancels” the person’s deportation, also 
requires a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a spouse, parent, 
or child who is a U.S. citizen. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006). 
For an analysis of gender in the context of cancellation of removal, see Jennifer Lindsley, 
Comment, All Relevant Factors: Gender in the Analysis of Exceptional and Extremely 
Unusual Hardship, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 337 (2004). 
 210. In relation to this point, Judge Ferguson suggested that not granting derivative 
asylum to parents can lead to ridiculous results. For instance, he noted that the majority in 
Abebe I denied the parent’s claim, in part, because they did not testify that they would 
definitely be unable to protect their daughter from FGM. Judge Ferguson stated that it 
was absurd to require that parents testify that they would be powerless to protect their 
daughter because where a parent stated just that in Olowo, the Seventh Circuit chastised 
the mother for “seeking to take her daughters with her [if she were deported] and ordered 
notification of state agencies charged with protecting ‘minors from parents who allow 
acts of torture to be committed on minors.’”  Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 762 (Ferguson, J., dis-
senting) (citing Olowo, 368 F.3d at 703–04). Thus, Judge Ferguson suggested that, under 
the majority’s logic, a parent will fail to establish a well-founded fear unless they argue 
that they are powerless to protect the child, but then face court-ordered removal of their 
children if their claim fails and they are deported. Id. at 761. 
 211. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 9, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 212. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 764 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, supra note 211, art. 9. The United States signed the treaty February 16, 1995, 
but has not yet ratified it. Office of the U.N. High Comm’n for Human Rights, Status of 
Ratification of the Principal Int’l Human Rights Treaties as of 09 June 2004, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. However, according to the Vienna Convention on 
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states to “ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her par-
ents against her will, except when . . . such separation is necessary for the 
best interests of the child.”213 Additionally, Judge Ferguson noted that the 
practice of not granting derivative asylum to parents is inconsistent with 
statements by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) that state that a “woman could be considered a refugee if her 
daughters feared being compelled to undergo FGM.”214 In addition, the 
UNHCR includes parents of minors in the list of persons eligible for de-
rivative refugee status.215 The reference to the UNHCR is germane be-
cause U.S. refugee and asylum law, to a great extent, tracks the legal in-
                                                                                                                                  
the Law of Treaties, signing a treaty expresses a state’s consent to be bound, unless oth-
erwise indicated. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties art. 12, opened for signa-
ture May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. While the United States has also not ratified this 
treaty, it is viewed as a restatement of the customary international law governing treaties. 
Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 141 n.15 (3d Cir. 2005); Ehrlich v. American Airlines, 
Inc. 360 F.3d 366, 373 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004). Similarly, it can be argued that the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child has attained the status of customary international law. A treaty 
is elevated to the status of international law and becomes binding upon all nations—even 
those states that have not ratified—when its contents become general and consistent prac-
tice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987). However, in the 
recent case of Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court did not entertain the notion that the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child was an expression of customary international law. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Instead, the Court stated that the failure of the 
United States to ratify the Convention indicates a lack of national consensus on the issue. 
Id. at 621–23 (referring specifically to the juvenile death penalty). For an argument in 
favor of ratifying the Convention on the Rights of the Child, see Howard Davidson, Chil-
dren’s Rights and American Law: A Response to “What’s Wrong with Children’s 
Rights,” 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 69 (2006). 
 213. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 211, art. 9. Similarly, Tchouk-
hrova I quoted article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which states that “family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is enti-
tled to protection by society and the State.” Tchoukhrova I, 404 F.3d at 1191 (quoting 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171). The United States ratified this treaty on September 8, 1992. 
Office of the U.N. High Comm’n for Human Rights, supra 212. 
 214. Abebe I, 379 F.3d at 763 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing HEAVEN CRAWLEY, 
REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS 181 (2001)). See also UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, MEMORANDUM: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, paras. 5, 
7, U.N. Doc. SUS/HCR/011 (May 10, 1994). 
 215. UNHCR, PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION UNDER 
UNHCR’S MANDATE § 5.1.2 (2005), available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4317 
223c9.pdf. 
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struments that created both the UNHCR and refugee law: the 1951 Refu-
gee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.216 
Not only does granting parents derivative asylum status have a legal 
basis in the INA, U.S. case law, and international refugee law, this ap-
proach is also grounded by other policy rationales, like ease of admini-
stration. On a practical level, granting derivative asylum to parents is the 
most efficient and simplest way to achieve the goal that decisions like 
Abay and Tchoukhrova sought to achieve: ensuring that a persecuted 
child is protected and that a parent need not choose between abandoning 
their child and exposing her to harm. When courts are compelled to grant 
such cases they must construct elaborate theories of mental harm and 
family group that, as noted above,217 are based on idiosyncratic interpre-
tations of the law that may not be followed by other courts. In contrast, 
following the derivative asylum approach would allow for a uniform rule 
that other circuits could follow without regard to their particular defini-
tions of persecution or family as a particular social group. In addition, 
such a rule would be easy to administer because the family would present 
only the claim of the minor child and the court would not need to adjudi-
cate additional claims of persecution by the parents. Having a blanket 
rule that, in cases where a child is the target of persecution, a parent is 
eligible for asylum would be far easier to administer than the approaches 
in Abay or Tchoukhrova. In addition, making parents eligible for deriva-
tive asylum in these cases has the administrative and economic benefit of 
preventing asylee children from becoming dependants of the state if their 
parents are deported. The U.S. immigration law has a strong policy 
against allowing potential “public charges” to enter the country and pro-
viding derivative status to parents would prevent asylee children from 
burdening the state’s child protective services administrations.218 
A potential policy argument against granting derivative asylum to par-
ents is that to do so would open the “floodgates” and lead to abuse of the 
immigration system. The argument is that if the courts granted derivative 
asylum to parents, every parent of every girl in sub-Saharan Africa 
would rush to the United States to claim asylum for their daughter and 
reap the derivative benefits. A similar argument was made when FGM 
                                                                                                                                  
 216. For instance, the definition of refugee, found at INA § 101(a)(42), is directly 
modeled off the first articles of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. 1951 
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1. 
 217. See supra Part IV. 
 218. For example, potential to become a public charge is a ground of inadmissibility 
that may bar a noncitizen from entering the U.S. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) 
(2006). It would be contrary to this policy to admit asylee children with no means of 
supporting themselves. 
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became a ground for asylum—that massive numbers of African women 
would flee to the United States to claim asylum—and that has not proven 
to be so.219 Most likely, there would not be a dramatic increase in asylum 
petitions from Africa if courts followed the derivative asylum rule. 
However, even if there were an increase in applications, arguably, the 
“floodgates” problem would be less massive than the “floodgates” that 
Tchoukhrova may have opened by rendering the derivative asylum pro-
vision meaningless. The derivative asylum approach would just apply the 
existing statute to parents, while Tchoukhrova entirely bypasses the stat-
ute and opened up the possibility that everyone who is part of a perse-
cuted family unit might be eligible for asylum—even if the individual is 
not the victim of persecution. If that were the case, brothers, sisters, 
grandparents, and cousins could all claim to be members of that family 
unit and apply for status. Thus, even in a worst-case scenario where the 
extension of derivative asylum to parents did increase the number of 
people claiming asylum, the result could not be worse than what might 
result from the undefined family unit principle in Tchoukhrova. 
Another argument that is often argued against granting parents deriva-
tive asylum status is that in some cases the child is a U.S. citizen and is 
therefore ineligible for asylum.220 The argument is that derivative status 
is logically impossible because the child has a legal right to remain in the 
U.S. and cannot be deported.221 However, this formalistic approach fails 
to consider the realities of children who, although they may have an ab-
stract legal right under U.S. immigration law, have no way to practically 
enjoy this right.222 In many cases, the child may not even be old enough 
to understand her predicament. As Judge Posner wrote in Oforji in rela-
tion to U.S. citizen children in this situation, “although they are citizens 
they are treated as badly as aliens.”223 Thus, denying derivative status to 
                                                                                                                                  
 219. Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 369 (Filppu, Board Member, concurring). There is no reli-
able, publicly available source of statistics on the number of people who have applied for 
asylum on the ground of FGM. A search of federal cases on the Westlaw database 
yielded forty-two court and BIA cases involving FGM. Westlaw Research Page, 
http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2006). However, this is not an accurate 
number of total cases because it does not include unpublished cases before immigration 
judges and the BIA. 
 220. Abebe II, 432 F.3d at 1048–50 (Tallman, J., dissenting); Oforji, 354 F.3d at 619–
20 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 221. Abebe II, 432 F.3d at 1048 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 222. See David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165 (2006) (evaluating the rights of parents and children 
where immigration law mandates the deportation of a parent). 
 223. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 620 (Posner, J., concurring). 
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parents on such a formalistic basis would achieve an absurd result if the 
parent were forced to return to a country where the child would be perse-
cuted. Refugee law was designed to protect against persecution and pro-
vide safe haven; it was not intended to remove children from safety and 
subject them to persecution. Such a result would be contrary to the very 
basic principles upon which international and U.S. refugee law is based. 
In short, granting derivative asylum to parents is the preferable ap-
proach to cases where a minor child is the target of persecution. The de-
rivative asylum approach can easily be read into the statutory silence of 
the INA on this matter and is in keeping with the U.S. immigration pol-
icy of family unity. Moreover, following the theory that parents are eli-
gible for derivative asylum is easy for the courts to administer because it 
is a coherent and uniform rule. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Note has sought to present a solid rationale for granting derivative 
asylum to the parents of persecuted minor children. Beginning with an 
examination of the case law on the subject, it has traced how the courts 
proceeded from treating derivative asylum for parents as an open ques-
tion in the early cases, to foreclosing the possibility in cases like Abay 
and Tchoukhrova, and now remanding the issue to the BIA to consider. 
The outcomes in those two cases were, arguably, consistent with existing 
asylum law, but the reasoning in each case was unnecessarily compli-
cated and each case’s holding is overly broad. In other words, Abay took 
an idiosyncratic approach to mental harm as persecution, while Tchouk-
hrova constructed a novel theory for considering harm to the entire fam-
ily unit. The reasoning in each case was outside the mainstream of asy-
lum law and, in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Thomas 
and Tchoukhrova, it appears unlikely that the BIA or the courts will fol-
low either case. As a result, meritorious claims will be denied because 
judges will continue to feel constrained by the silence of the INA on the 
issue of derivative asylum for parents. 
Interpreting the derivative asylum provision of the INA to apply to 
parents is a better approach for the reasons discussed above. To do so is 
legally coherent because the silence in the INA does not preclude the 
extension of derivative immigration status to parents. A derivative asy-
lum rule would be uniform and courts could follow it without the fear of 
diluting their constructions of the notion of persecution. Its uniformity 
also would further judicial and administrative efficiency because the rule 
is easy to apply and administer. Similarly, applying the statutory provi-
sion to parents is a way of saving it from the obsolescence to which the 
Tchoukhrova decision relegated it: Tchoukhrova stripped the derivative 
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asylum provision of any real meaning by considering harm cumulatively 
to the family unit and allowing any family member to make a claim. A 
rule that allows parents to receive derivative asylum status would pre-
serve the efficacy of the derivative asylum provision and rein in the 
broad holding of Tchoukhrova. Granting derivative asylum to parents is 
in keeping with the policy of family unity in U.S. immigration law and 
with the instruments of international law that concern the rights of chil-
dren and refugees. Finally, the derivative asylum approach avoids the 
terrible “Solomonic choice”224 where parents must decide between aban-
doning their child in the U.S. or taking her back to persecution at home. 
In sum, there is ample authority in the law to suggest that the silence in 
the INA can be read to allow for the extension of derivative asylum to 
parents, or, in the alternative, that Congress should amend the INA in 
order to expressly bring the statute in line with the realities of today’s 
child asylum seekers. 
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